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a b s t r a c t
We offer a policy-basis for interpreting, justifying, and designing (3, 3)-political rules, a large class of col-
lective rules analogous to those governing the selection of papers in peer-reviewed journals, where each
referee chooses to accept, reject, or invite a resubmission of a paper, and an editor aggregates his own and
referees’ opinions into one of these three recommendations. We prove that any such rule is a weighted
multicameral rule: a policy is collectively approved at a given level if and only if it is approved by aminimal
number of chambers — the dimension of the rule —where each chamber evaluates a different aspect of the
policy using a weighted rule, with each evaluator’s weight or authority possibly varying across chambers
depending on his area(s) of expertise. These results imply that a given rule is only suitable for evaluating
finite-dimensional policies whose dimension corresponds to that of the rule, and they provide a rationale
for using different rules to pass different policies even within the same organization. We further intro-
duce the concept of compatibility with a rule and exploit its topological properties to propose a method
to construct integer weights corresponding to evaluators’ possible judgments under a given rule, which
are more intuitive and easier to interpret for policymakers. Our findings shed light on multicameralism
in political institutions and multi-criteria group decision-making in the firm. We provide applications to
peer review politics, rating systems, and real-world organizations.
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY license.1. Introduction
Collective organizational rules are central to the governance of
countries, collectivities, clubs, and corporations. They define the
procedure by which collective decisions are made, and contain
mechanisms for how the preferences of different individuals are
aggregated to yield a collective outcome. The simplest collective
rules are weighted rules, where each individual has a certain num-
ber of votes (or seats), and a policy proposal is adopted if and only
if the total number of votes it receives surpasses a certain thresh-
old or quota. In the real world, however, many organizations use
more complicated rules to make decisions. An important class of
such rules is the class of (3, 3)-political rules, which are rules anal-
ogous to those governing the selection of papers in peer-reviewed
journals, where each referee chooses to accept, reject, or invite a
resubmission of a paper, and an editor aggregates his own and ref-
erees’ opinions into one of these three recommendations. In this
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0304-4068 © 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY lpaper, we show that any such rule, nomatter its complexity, can be
written as a collection of perfectly complementary weighted rules,
which has important policy implications for the interpretation, de-
sign and suitability of collective decision-making mechanisms.
The class of (3, 3)-political rules generalizes well-known
classes of rules, including (2, 2)-political rules under which each
voter either supports or opposes a policy proposal, the collective
outcome being either the adoption of the proposal or its failure.
These latter rules, which were introduced by von Neumann
and Morgenstern (1944), have served as the cornerstone of the
analysis of group decision-making in a broad range of important
studies in game theory (e.g., Shapley (1953), Arrow (1963), Peleg
(1978, 1984), Taylor and Zwicker (1999), Ray (2007), Laruelle and
Valenciano (2008) and Pongou et al. (2008)), political economy
(e.g., Barberà and Jackson (2006), Brams (1975) and Acemoglu et al.
(2011)), and corporate governance (e.g., Leech (1988, 2003)). But
despite their influence, scholars have argued that (2, 2)-political
rules are restrictive, as more than two levels of individual and
collective approval are generally observed in real-life decisions
(Fishburn (1973); Felsenthal and Machover (1997, 1998); Freixas
and Zwicker (2003, 2009); Pongou et al. (2011); Tchantcho et al.
(2008, 2010); Rubinstein (1980); Hsiao and Raghavan (1993)). For
icense.
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against any of the candidates, or might abstain, a reality forcefully
brought to scholarly awareness by Felsenthal andMachover (1997,
1998) and further generalized to a model of games with multiple
inputs and outputs by Freixas and Zwicker (2003, 2009). This
compelling argument partly motivates our focus on more realistic
collective decision-making mechanisms such as (3, 3)-political
rules.
In this paper, we offer a policy basis for interpreting and design-
ing such collective rules. Below, we state our main findings and
discuss their policy implications.
1. First, we show that any (3, 3)-political rule can be decomposed
into a hierarchical system of two weighted multicameral leg-
islatures: the first legislature determines whether a proposal
should be collectively approved at the highest level, such as
accepting a paper, whereas the second legislature determines
whether it should be collectively approved at the intermediate
level, such as inviting a resubmission of a paper after revision.
A proposal that fails in each of the two legislatures is simply
collectively rejected. Each legislature consists of several special-
ized houses or chambers, and a policy proposal is adopted if and
only if it is approved by each house, with each house using a
weighted rule in that each decision-maker is assigned a (vector)
weight that measures his political influence in that house, and
a proposal passes the vote in that house if and only if the sum of
points representing voters’ opinions exceeds a predetermined
quota. If we denote by d1 the minimum number of houses of
the first legislature, and by d2 the minimum number of houses
of the second legislature, we say that the corresponding politi-
cal rule is of 2-dimension (d1, d2).
A practical implication of such a weighted multicameral repre-
sentation of a (3, 3)-political rule is that such a rule can be inter-
preted as a multi-criteria decision-making rule that explicitly
asks decision-makers to evaluate different aspects of a proposal
to be voted on. Each house evaluates one aspect, with each
decision-maker’s influence or authority possibly varying across
houses depending on his area(s) of expertise. Importantly, since
different rules generally have different dimensions, it follows
that each rule is best suited for evaluating finite-dimensional
policies whose dimension (number of aspects to be evaluated)
corresponds to that of the rule, and that not all policies can be
evaluated using the same rule. For instance, a one-dimensional
policy such as the tax rate should be evaluated using a different
rule than policies of two or more dimensions.
2. Second, we show that any (3, 3)-political rule can be written
as the minimum of a finite number of ‘‘quasi-weighted’’ (3, 3)-
political rules (in a sense to be defined). This allows us to intro-
duce the concept of quasi-dimension of a political rule, which
generalizes the traditional concept of political dimension intro-
duced by Taylor and Zwicker (1993).
3. Third, for any given pair of naturals (d1, d2), one can always de-
sign a (3, 3)-political rule of 2-dimension (d1, d2). This finding
has important implications for the design of constitutions that
value the inputs of different experts for the passage of a finite-
dimensional policy. For instance, if onewants to construct a rule
under which a proposal is collectively approved at a given level
if and only if it satisfies a finite set of criteria, this is always pos-
sible. In fact, the number of criteria determines d1 and d2. One
can therefore set the standards for policies first, and then de-
sign the rules that would justify the passage of policies meeting
those standards or criteria. For instance, one can always design a
rule to select the winner of the election of Miss Universe where
each contestant is judged regarding predetermined criteria
such as beauty, self-confidence and ability to communicate.
This finding theoretically provides a rationale for using different
rules to pass different policies even within the same organiza-
tion.4. Fourth, based on a newly defined concept of compatibility with
a rule, we show that there exist infinitely many weighted mul-
ticameral rules that are compatible with a (3, 3)-political rule,
and prove that these rules constitute a topologically open set.
Further applying topological concepts, we propose a method to
construct integer weights to record the possible judgments of
an expert, which are more intuitive and much easier to inter-
pret for policymakers who vote on a regular basis.
To illustrate our main findings, let us consider this ‘‘thought’’
process of selecting a paper for publication in a journal. Suppose
that a paper has two parts, one theoretical and the other empirical.
The editor (E) invites four scholars, two theorists (T1 and T2) and
two empiricists (E1 and E2), to evaluate each aspect of the paper.
We imagine a collective decision-making rule defined as follows:
• The paper is accepted if the following two situations occur:
– At least one of the referees with expertise in theory finds that
the paper makes a theoretical contribution, and similarly, at
least one of the empirical referees judges the paper to make
an empirical contribution.
– None of the four referees rejects the paper.
• The paper is rejected if it is judged by the two theoretical
referees to make no theoretical contribution or it is judged by
the two empirical referees to make no empirical contribution.
• The paper is invited to be resubmitted after revision in all other
cases.
If we letR1 = {T1, T2} andR2 = {E1, E2}, we can summarize
this (3, 3)-political rule by the following characteristic functionV:
V(X1, X2, X3)
=

2 (paper is accepted) if |X1 ∩Ri| = 2 or
|X1 ∩Ri| and |X2 ∩Ri| = 1 for any i = 1, 2
0 (paper is rejected) if |X3 ∩R1| or |X3 ∩R2| = 2
1 (resubmission is invited) otherwise
where (X1, X2, X3) is a vote profile in which X1, X2 and X3 are
respectively the sets of evaluators accepting the paper, inviting a
resubmission, and rejecting the paper, and |X1|, for instance, is the
cardinality of X1.
We note that in the example above, the editor could be one of
the referees (e.g., E = T1 or E = E1), and if he has expertise in
both aspects of the paper, he could play the role of two referees,
which would allow him to express possibly different views on the
theoretical and empirical contributions of the paper.1
As we can see, the formalization of this rule by its characteristic
function V is economical, but a bit complex. However, we show
that it can simply be represented as a pair of weighted two-house
legislatures as in the following table:
Legislature 1 Legislature 2
Theory Empirics Theory Empirics
Referee T1 (2, 1, 0) (0, 0, 0) (2, 1, 0) (0, 0, 0)
Referee T2 (2, 1, 0) (0, 0, 0) (2, 1, 0) (0, 0, 0)
Referee E1 (0, 0, 0) (2, 1, 0) (0, 0, 0) (2, 1, 0)
Referee E2 (0, 0, 0) (2, 1, 0) (0, 0, 0) (2, 1, 0)
Quota 3 3 1 1
The first legislature (Legislature 1) determines whether the pa-
per will be accepted. In this legislature, the theoretical contribu-
tion of the paper is evaluated in the first house (called Theory), and
1 Note that under a different rule, the editor might have the right to overrule the
recommendation of the referees. This situation corresponds to the dictatorial rule.
In general, it is always possible to design a rule under which some evaluators have
more power than others.
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In each house, each voter has a three-component vector weight
corresponding to the three possible judgments of the paper (ac-
cept, resubmit paper, and reject). In the first house, each theoret-
ical referee is assigned a vector weight of (2, 1, 0), which means
that the paper receives 2 points if accepted by a theoretical ref-
eree, 1 point if invited to be revised and resubmitted, and 0 points
otherwise. Each empirical referee is assigned a vector weight of
(0, 0, 0), which means that their opinion on the theoretical as-
pect of the paper does not count. The paper passes the theoretical
test if the sum of points received by the paper after each decision-
maker evaluates its theoretical contribution is at least equal to 3.
In the second house, each theoretical referee is assigned a vector
weight of (0, 0, 0), and each empirical referee a vector weight of
(2, 1, 0), and the paper passes the empirical test if it receives at
least 3 points. So only the empirical referees wield power in the
second house. The second legislature (Legislature 2) determines
whether the paper will be invited to be revised and resubmitted. In
this legislature, each evaluator has the same weight as in the first
legislature; however, the paper can be resubmitted if and only if it
receives at least 1 point in each of the two houses. The 2-dimension
of this peer review rule is (2, 2).
Like the characteristic function V , most collective rules or con-
stitutions are unfortunately simply defined as a distribution of vot-
ing power among the different subgroups of voters. In general,
there is no rationale for the nature of policies that can be evaluated
under these rules, which are also silent on the precise role of each
voter in making decisions. A decomposition such as the one per-
formed for V , however, addresses those shortcomings, as it shows
that V is best suited for the evaluation of two-dimensional pol-
icy proposals, where each dimension is evaluated using aweighted
rule. It also clearly describes theweight given to the opinion of each
voter along each dimension. Such an approach further suggests a
transparent and policy-driven method to design rules. Indeed, in-
stead of defining a rule by its characteristic function as it is usually
done, one can simply fix the number of criteria to bemet by a policy
to be collectively adopted under such a rule and define a weighted
rule for each criterion, which is a simple exercise. Such a method
would clearly value the opinion of experts, as the weight given to
the judgment of a voter can be made to vary across the different
dimensions.
Given that the class of (3, 3)-political rules generalizes well-
known classes of rules, including (2, 2)-political rules, (3, 2)-
political rules, and (2, 3)-political rules, our findings extend to
these latter classes of collective mechanisms as well. Within our
framework, (2, 2)-political rules and (3, 2)-political rules have 2-
dimension (or simply dimension) (m, 0), wherem is a natural num-
ber at least equal to 1. A well-known example of such a rule is
the procedure to revise the Canadian Constitution (Kilgour (1983);
Taylor and Zwicker (1999)). Under this procedure, a proposal to
amend the Canadian Constitution becomes law only if it is ap-
proved by at least seven of the ten Canadian provinces, subject to
the proviso that the approving provinces constitute at least half of
Canada’s population. Thus, this voting rule, which can be shown to
be of dimension (2, 0), assigns two weights to each province, with
the first representing the vote cast on the proposal by the province,
and the second representing its population share. The case where
m = 1 represents the well-known class of weighted voting rules.
These rules are the most appealing way of modeling voting power
inequality in an assembly where each member retains a certain
number of votes. Our analysis implies that such rules are most ap-
propriate for evaluating one-dimensional policies.
In addition to generalizingwell-known classes of political rules,
our finding that (3, 3)-political rules can be viewed as systems of
weighted multicameral legislatures provides a rationale for multi-
cameralism in political institutions (Rowley and Schneider (2004);
Buchanan and Tullock (1962); Bräuninger (2003)), and multi-
criteria decision-making in market organizations. Multicameral-
ism better captures the complexity of the notion of representationby its ability to aggregate diverse interests. The greater the num-
ber of houses, the greater the probability of the legislature to pro-
vide multiple perspectives on an issue, as our findings imply. Un-
der multicameralism, representatives sharing a common interest
are usually grouped in the same committee. Some interesting ex-
amples are: the Westminster system in Britain with two houses
(the house of Lords and the house of the commons), the South
Africa’s apartheid government in 1983 with three race-based
houses (White, Colored, Asians), the Medieval Scandinavian delib-
erative assemblies with four houses (the nobility, the clergy, the
burghers, and the peasants), and the Council of the International
Seabed Authority (ISA) with four houses, each representing the in-
terest of a specific group of agents (consumers, investors, produc-
ers of minerals, developing countries and some other countries).2
Similarly, a firm’s decision is sometimes determined by the differ-
ent opinions expressed by its different departments as discussed in
Baucells and Sarin (2003). In this case, a department (e.g., the mar-
keting or theR&Ddepartment) plays the role of a specializedhouse.
Our paper also generalizes classical results on multicameral
representation of (2, 2)-political rules (Taylor and Zwicker (1992,
1993, 1999)). Taylor and Zwicker were the first to show that these
latter rules have a weighted multicameral representation. They
also introduced the algebraic notion of dimension and argued that
it is a ‘‘measure of the complexity’’ of a voting mechanism. They
further showed that there exists a (2, 2)-political rule of any given
dimension. The concept of dimension has served as the corner-
stone of many subsequent studies extending Taylor and Zwicker’s
results (see, e.g., Freixas and Puente (2008) andDeineko andWoeg-
inger (2006)). Laruelle and Valenciano (2011) extend the concept
of dimension to voting rules allowing four inputs not necessarily
ranked, and two possible collective outputs.
It follows from these studies that the focus has mainly been on
rules that yield only two possible collective outcomes such as pass-
ing or failing a bill. However, many real-world group decisions are
not binary. Our thought example of the process of selecting papers
in a journal is a point in case. But there are other examples. A win-
ner of a beauty contestmay be the queen, the first runner-up, or the
second runner-up. Hierarchy in the victory is also encountered in
many sport competitions where the winners can receive the gold,
silver, or bronze medal based upon judges’ allotment of scores.
Similarly, in a legislative assembly, a bill may pass or fail, or the de-
cision on its passage may be adjourned, which might be a desired
outcome for certain legislators who still have to make their mind.
In addition to generalizing the literature by focusing on rules
with more than two inputs and outputs, our analysis yields new
theoretical findings that have important policy implications for
the interpretation and design of political rules. Following basic
definitions in Section 2, we show that a (3, 3)-political rule is a
hierarchical systemof two legislatures in Section 3. Building on this
result, in Section 4, we introduce two new theories of dimension,
namely the concepts of 2-dimension and quasi-dimension, which
fully capture the complexity of (3, 3)-political rules. These theories
imply that most constitutions are implicit multi-criteria decision-
making rules under which each voter can be seen as an expert who
has the ability to judge the pertinence of a proposal only in his
area(s) of expertise. We also show that one can always design a
decision-making rule that values the views of specialized experts,
and that is only suited for the evaluation of policies of a given
dimension. In Section 5, we introduce the concept of compatibility
with a rule and show that every (3, 3)-political rule has aweighted
multicameral representation with integer weights and quotas. Our
proofs are new. Section 6 provides some applications to real-world
organizations, and Section 7 concludes.
2 Note, however, that the fact that like-minded representatives are often grouped
in the same chamber under multicameralism might lead to strategic voting, as
shown by Dewan and Spirling (2011) with respect to the Westminster system.
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N = {1, 2, . . . , n} is a non-empty set of evaluators, players, or
voters. Subsets of N are coalitions. For any finite set S, we denote
by |S| the number of elements of S.
Voters are invited to vote on a proposal a. Each voter may vote
for or against a, or may express an intermediate level of approval
such as abstaining.3 We denote by X1 the set of voters who vote for,
X2 the set of voters who express the intermediate of approval, and
X3 the set of voters who vote against. We call X = (X1, X2, X3) a
tripartition of N or a vote profile,4and we denote by N3 the set of
all vote profiles of N .
2.1. (3, 3)-political rules
A (3, 3)-political rule is a pair (N,V)where V is a function that
maps each vote profile of N into one of three possible collective
outcomes in the set {0, 1, 2}. 2 means that the proposal voted on
is collectively accepted, 1 means that it is adjourned, and 0 means
that it is rejected.When no confusion is possible,V will be used for
(N,V).
(3, 3)-political rules might have different applications and in-
terpretations depending on the context. In a legislature, a legisla-
tor might support or oppose a policy proposal or abstain, and the
lattermight pass, fail, or be adjourned. In the academic peer review
context where each evaluator recommends either acceptance, re-
jection, or resubmission of a paper (the intermediate level of ap-
proval), the final collective outcome is usually one of these three
recommendations. In the context of the comprehensive examina-
tion of Ph.D. candidates in the United States, a student can pass the
exam both at the Master and Ph.D. levels, fail the exam both at the
Master and Ph.D. levels, or pass the exam only at the Master level.
Two special classes of (3, 3)-political rules are the classes of
(3, 2)-political rules and (2, 2)-political rules. Under a (3, 2)-
political rule, voters have three options, but there are only two pos-
sible collective outcomes, such as adopting or failing a proposal.
Under a (2, 2)-political rule, voters have only two options, such as
supporting or opposing a measure, and the collective outcome is
either the adoption or the failure of the measure.
This paper uses the standard definition of a (3, 2)-political rule
as a rule that maps each vote profile of N into one of two possible
collective outcomes in the set {0, 1}. In this case, 0 means the
proposal has failed, and 1 means the proposal is accepted.
2.2. Monotonicity
One of the most intuitive properties of political rules is the
monotonicity property. A (3, 3)-political rule is monotonic if any
increase in an individual’s level of support for a proposal, ceteris
paribus, cannot decrease the collectivity’s suffrage for that pro-
posal. To be more specific, let us consider two vote profiles X and
Y on a proposal a. We say that X is a sub-tripartition of Y or Y is a
super-tripartition of X (and we write X ⊆3 Y ) to convey that each
voter’s level of support for a is weakly greater in Y than in X . For-
mally, X is a sub-tripartition of Y if either X = Y or X can be trans-
formed into Y by moving one or more voters to a higher level of
approval, everything else being equal. On the other hand, if X is
a sub-tripartition of Y , distinct to Y , we write X ⊂3 Y , and we say
that X is a strict sub-tripartition of Y or that Y is a strict super-
tripartition of X .
We define Xj ↑ as the set of the voters who choose a level of
approval higher than j, whichmeans X1 ↑= X1, X2 ↑= X1∪X2, and
X3 ↑= X1 ∪ X2 ∪ X3.
3 The intermediate level of approval has several interpretations depending on the
context, as we will see in Section 2.1.
4 Any of the sets Xi (i = 1, 2, 3)may be empty; however, their union is the set of
all the voters N .We say that a (3, 3)-political ruleV ismonotonic if for any vote
profiles X , Y such that X is a sub-partition of Y ,V(X) ≤ V(Y ). This
means that if X can make a proposal approved at a given level, so
does Y . This is because voters have weakly higher level of support
for the proposal in Y than in X .
2.3. Minimal winning and maximal losing vote profiles
As stated earlier, a (3, 2)-political rule G = (N,V) is a vot-
ing rule with only two possible outcomes (such as accepting or
rejecting a proposal). Vote profiles that lead to the approval of
the proposal are calledwinning vote profiles orwinning tripartitions
(V(X) = 1), and those that lead to the rejection of the proposal are
losing vote profiles or losing tripartitions (V(X) = 0). A vote profile
X is said to be minimal winning if every strict sub-tripartition of X
is losing, and X is said to be maximal losing if every strict super-
tripartition of X is winning.
2.4. Monotonic weighted multicameral (3, 3)-political rules
In the following, we provide a definition of a weighted mul-
ticameral (3, 3)-political rule. Intuitively, a multicameral politi-
cal rule is a rule under which the vote takes place simultane-
ously in a set of houses or chambers, here denoted by C. As more
restrictive conditions should be fulfilled to shift a proposal to
a higher level of approval, we split C into two disjoint sets of
houses C1 and C2, where each set of houses constitutes a leg-
islature. C2 represents the set of all the houses that must ap-
prove the proposal for it to earn the second level of collective ap-
proval. However, to earn the highest level of approval, the pro-
posal should be approved in the additional number of houses
that constitute C1. Let d be the total number of houses (d =|C|). We use the letters i to index the d houses, and j to in-
dex the levels of approval of a voter (1 ≤ i ≤ d and 1 ≤
j ≤ 3). Each house i is characterized by a quota qi; each legis-
lator p in house i has a three-component vector weight wi(p) =
(wi1(p), wi2(p), wi3(p)), meaning that the number of additional
points credited to a proposal in that house is wi1(p) when p votes
for it,wi2(p)when p abstains, andwi3(p)when p votes against it5;
a proposal is approved in house i if the sum of points credited to
it after everybody has voted is at least equal to the quota qi. Our
formal definition is below.
Definition 1. Let G = (N,V) be a (3, 3)-political rule. A weighted
multicameral representation of G is a list (C1,C2, w, q) that satis-
fies the three following conditions:
(1) A vote profile X leads to the highest level of collective ap-
proval of a proposal if and only if the proposal is approved in all
the voting chambers (V(X) = 2 if and only if wi(X) ≥ qi for every
house i in C1 ∪ C2, wherewi(X) =wij(p)|p ∈ Xj |1 ≤ j ≤
3

is the sumof points credited to the proposal in house i after each
voter has chosen a level of support, resulting in X).
(2) A vote profile X leads to the intermediate level of collective
approval of a proposal if and only if the proposal is approved in all
the chambers of C2, but is rejected in at least one of the chambers
of C1 (V(X) = 1 if and only if there is a house i in C1 such that
wi(X) < qi and for every house i in C2,wi(X) ≥ qi).
(3) A vote profile X leads to the collective rejection of a proposal
if and only if the proposal is rejected in at least one of the cham-
bers of C2 (V(X) = 0 if and only if there is a house i in C2 such that
wi(X) < qi).
The table describing the peer review system in the Introduc-
tion is a simple illustrative example of the definition of a weighted
5 For instance, in the example in the Introduction, the vector weights for
theoretical referees and empirical referees in the Theory house are respectively:
wTheory(T1) = wTheory(T2) = (2, 1, 0), andwTheory(E1) = wTheory(E2) = (0, 0, 0). In
Legislature 1, the quota in the Theory house is qTheory = 3.
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is evaluated along both theoretical and empirical dimensions, al-
though the evaluation is stricter in the first legislature than in
the second. Therefore, the set of criteria can be written as C1 =
{Theory(1), Empirics(1)} for the first legislature and C2 = {Theory
(2), Empirics(2)} for the second, where Theory(1), for instance, in-
dicates the ‘‘theory’’ criterion in the first legislature together with
the rule that is used to validate it. We also note that while the vec-
tor weight of a voter does not vary across the two legislatures in
that example, a voter’s vector weight does vary across legislatures
in general.
A political rule is said to be aweightedmulticameral political rule
if it has a weighted multicameral representation. Note that C1 =
∅ corresponds to the particular case of weighted multicameral
(3, 2)-political rules. If additionally,C2 has only one house, the cor-
responding (3, 2)-political rule is said to be weighted. We will say
that a (3, 3)-political rule G is weighted when the decision criteria
are unidimensional, which means both C1 and C2 are singletons.
Under a weighted multicameral political rule, a voter’s weight
associated with a given level of approval might vary across houses,
which implies that a voter may be more influential in certain
houses than others, as illustrated in the example in the Intro-
duction. In each legislature, each theoretical referee has a greater
weight in the Theory house than in the Empirics house. Similarly,
each empirical referee has a greater weight in the Empirics house
than in the Theory house. A house in which a voter has a high level
of influence may be viewed as the house dealing with matters on
which that voter is an expert.We therefore think of houses as being
specialized, and of voters as experts who have decentralized author-
ity and vote only on specific aspects of a proposal under consider-
ation.
3. A (3, 3)-political rule as a hierarchical system of legislatures
In this section, we show that a (3, 3)-political rule can be
viewed as a hierarchical system of legislatures, with each using a
(3, 2)-political rule. More precisely, we show that voting under a
(3, 3)-political rule G is equivalent to voting simultaneously under
two (3, 2)-political rules G1 and G2. The rule G1 determines whe-
ther the proposal should be granted the highest level of approval
while the rule G2 decides whether or not the proposal should be
granted the intermediate level of approval. The formal result is as
follows:
Remark 1. Let G = (N,V) be a (3, 3)-political rule. Recall that a
(3, 2)-political rule is entirely characterized by the set of all itswin-
ning vote profiles. Define the (3, 2)-political rulesV1 andV2 as fol-
lows: for every vote profile X , (V1(X) = 1 if and only if V(X) = 2)
and (V2(X) = 1 if and only if V(X) ∈ {2, 1}). This means V1 con-
siders as winning vote profiles only those that lead to the highest
level of collective approval of a proposal, whereas thewinning vote
profiles ofV2 are those that lead to the approval level at least equal
to the intermediate level.
The decomposition of V as given in Remark 1 yields a unique
pair of (3, 2)-political rules (V1,V2).6 Wewrite V = V1 ⋆V2 and
we say thatV1 ⋆V2 is a (3, 2)-decomposition ofV orV is a (3, 3)-
composition ofV1 andV2.V1 is of a higher standard thanV2 in the
sense that it is more difficult for a policy proposal to pass underV1
than underV2 holding voters’ opinions fixed.7We say that the pair
(V1,V2) is ordered.8
6 Mathematically, V1 and V2 satisfy V = V1 + V2 .
7 Notice that V1 ≤ V2 since V1(X) ≤ V2(X) for any vote profile X .
8 In general, decomposing a (3, 3)-political ruleG asV1+V2 does not necessarily
provide a (3, 2)-decomposition of G. A necessary and sufficient condition for V1 +The following theorem summarizes the point just made:
Theorem 1. Every (3, 3)-political rule has a unique (3, 2)-decompo-
sition.
Remark 1 proves Theorem 1 by establishing a one-to-one map-
ping between the set of (3, 3)-political rules V and the set of or-
dered pairs (V1,V2) of (3, 2)-political rules.
One of the implications of Theorem 1 is that some of the prop-
erties of (3, 2)-political rules can be extend to the class of (3, 3)-
political rules using the (3, 2)-decomposition of (3, 3)-political
rules.
The following result provides a necessary and sufficient condi-
tion for a (3, 3)-political rule to be weighted.
Proposition 1. Let G = (N,V) be a (3, 3)-political rule andV1 ⋆V2
the (3, 2)-decomposition of V .V is weighted if and only if V1 andV2
are weighted (3, 2)-political rules.
The proof of this result is constructed as follows: given a
weighted (3, 3)-political rule V , from the weights of V , we con-
struct the weights of the two weighted (3, 2)-political rules that
compose V . Conversely, if the weights of V1 and V2 are known,
we show how to retrieve a system of weights for the rule V1 ⋆ V2.
See Appendix A for a formal proof.
Consider a pair ofweighted (3, 2)-political rules (V1,V2). If (V1,
V2) is ordered, then the weighted (3, 3)-political rule V1 + V2 is
equal to V1 ⋆ V2 and is said to be a weighted (3, 3)-political rule.
However, when (V1, V2) is not ordered, the (3, 3)-political rule
V1 + V2 is not necessarily weighted. In this case, we said that
V1 + V2 is a quasi-weighted (3, 3)-political rule.
We can notice that a weighted (3, 3)-political rule is quasi-
weighted although the converse is not necessarily true. Moreover,
the notion of quasi-weighted rule coincides on the class of (3, 2)-
political rules with the concept of weighted rule. Any weighted
(3, 2)-political rule can be viewed as a (3, 2)-composition of two
weighted political rules V1 and V2 where V = V1 and V2 is the
trivial political rule which considers any vote profile as winning.
4. New theories of dimension
Previous studies have characterized voting rules using the
traditional concept of dimension introduced by Taylor and Zwicker
(1993). They show that any monotonic (2, 2)-political rule has a
weighted multicameral representation with a minimal number of
houses called dimension. Intuitively, the dimension of a monotonic
(2, 2)-political rule can be interpreted as the minimum number of
houses that must accept a proposal in order for it to be adopted
by the collectivity. This concept, however, does not apply to rules
with more than two levels of collective approval, as the outcome
of the rule can no longer be formulated as accepting or rejecting a
proposal. Under a (3, 3)-political rule, a proposal can be approved
at two levels, the highest level and the intermediate level, the third
level being its rejection. It seems reasonable to require that the
first two levels of approval be incorporated in the definition of
the dimension of a monotonic (3, 3)-political rule, which we do
in this section. To this effect, we introduce the concept of quasi-
dimension and that of 2-dimension.
4.1. The quasi-dimension of a (3, 3)-political rule
Earlier studies have shown that a (2, 2)-political rule is a finite
intersection of weighted (2, 2)-political rules (intersection should
be understood as minimum). According to Taylor and Zwicker
V2 to be a (3, 2)-decomposition of G is that the pair (V1,V2) be ordered. We can
also notice that the decomposition V1 + V2 preserves monotonicity in the sense
that if G is monotonic, thenV1 andV2 are monotonic too. Conversely we can verify
that if V1 and V2 are monotonic, then V1 + V2 is monotonic.
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minimum integer m such that G can be written as the minimum
of m weighted (2, 2)-political rules. In the following, we repre-
sent a (3, 3)-political rule as the minimum of a finite number of
quasi-weighted (3, 3)-political rules. We then define the quasi-
dimension of a (3, 3)-political rule G as the minimum number of
quasi-weighted (3, 3)-political rules necessary to construct G. A
formal definition of the quasi-dimension of a (3, 3)-political rule
is provided below:
Definition 2. The quasi-dimension of a (3, 3)-political ruleG is the
minimum integer m such that G can be written as the minimum
ofm quasi-weighted (3, 3)-political rules but cannot be written as
the minimum ofm− 1 quasi-weighted (3, 3)-political rules.
The above definition is an extension of the concept of dimension
as defined on the class of (2, 2)-political rules. In the following,
we therefore generalize some results obtained for (2, 2)-political
rules.
Theorem 2. Every monotonic (3, 3)-political rule has a weighted
multicameral representation and can be written as the minimum of
a finite number of (monotonic) quasi-weighted (3, 3)-political rules.
The proof of this theorem is Appendix B. First, we show that
every monotonic (3, 2)-political rule has a multicameral repre-
sentation and is the minimum of a finite number of weighted
(3, 2)-political rules (the dimension of a (3, 2)-political rule can-
not exceed the number of maximal losing vote profiles). Then
we propose a method to construct a multicameral representation
of the (3, 3)-political rule G from the system of weights of the
(3, 2)-political rules that compose G. Finally we show that the sub-
political rules that compose G are quasi-weighted (3, 3)-political
rules.
The following result establishes that the concept of quasi-
dimension iswell defined on the class ofmonotonic (3, 3)-political
rules.
Proposition 2. Every monotonic (3, 3)-political rule has finite
quasi-dimension.
The proof of this result is straightforward, given Theorem 2.
4.2. The 2-dimension of a (3, 3)-political rule
We introduce the concept of 2-dimension of amonotonic (3, 3)-
political rule. It is a vector (d1, d2) ∈ N × N ∪ {0}where d1 is the
minimum number of houses that must accept a proposal in order
for it to be collectively approved at the highest level, and d2 the
minimum number of houses that must accept a proposal in order
for it to be collectively approved at the intermediate level. Below,
we provide a formal definition of the concept of 2-dimension.
Definition 3. Let G = (N,V) be a monotonic (3, 3)-political rule
andV1⋆V2 the (3, 2)-decomposition ofV . The 2-dimension ofV is
the vector (d1, d2)where d1 and d2 are respectively the dimensions
of V1 and V2.
We note that the notion of 2-dimension generalizes the tra-
ditional notion of dimension since the two concepts coincide on
the class of (3, 2)-political rules and (2, 2)-political rules. Indeed,
amonotonic (3, 2)-political rule of dimension d can be seen as hav-
ing 2-dimension (d, 0).
The following theorem establishes that the concept of 2-
dimension iswell defined on the class ofmonotonic (3, 3)-political
rules.
Theorem 3. The 2-dimension of a monotonic (3, 3)-political rule
always exists.If one assumes that one-dimensional policies should be evalu-
ated using weighted (or one-dimensional) rules, from a policy per-
spective, Theorem3 implies that a givenmonotonic (3, 3)-political
rule is only suited for the evaluation of finite-dimensional policies
whose dimension corresponds to that of the rule, with each aspect
of the policy being evaluated in a different house or chamber using
a weighted rule. The fact that any such rule has a weighted multi-
cameral representation also implies that any (3, 3)-political rule is
a collection of perfectly complementaryweighted rules in the sense
that a policy proposal cannot be approved at a given level if it is
not approved under each of the weighted rules of the legislature
deciding on the approval of the proposal at that level (in fact, the
rule used in each legislature is aminimumofweighted rules,which
means that if a policy proposal fails under one of these rules thus
yielding an outcome of zero for that rule, the minimumwill there-
fore be zero, and so the proposal will fail overall in that legislature).
We also have the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Let m be a positive integer. There always exists
a monotonic (3, 2)-political rule of dimension m (or 2-dimension
(m, 0)).
Wenowprove that there exists amonotonic (3, 3)-political rule
of any 2-dimension.
Theorem 4. Let d1 and d2 be two positive integers. There exists a
monotonic (3, 3)-political rule of 2-dimension (d1, d2).
Proposition 3 and Theorem 4 imply that one can always design a
(3, 3)-political rule for evaluating a policy that has to meet a set of
d1 criteria to be approved at the highest level and a set of d2 criteria
to be approved at the intermediate level, where the d2 criteria in
the second set altogether are somewhat weaker than the d1 crite-
ria in the first set so that a policy that satisfies the first set of crite-
ria automatically satisfies the second set, while the converse is not
true in general. This means that one can set the criteria for policies
first, and then design the rules that rationalize the passage of poli-
cies meeting those criteria. This result also provides a rationale for
using different rules to evaluate different policies, even within the
same organization.
5. Useful topology of political rules for policymakers
In this section, we introduce the concept of compatibility with
a rule, whichwe subsequently use to show that any (3, 3)-political
rule has a weightedmulticameral representation in whichweights
and quotas are integers. Weights therefore represent the number
of votes, which facilitates the interpretation of political rules for
policymakers.
5.1. Compatibility
We introduce the concept of compatibility of a real vector with
a rule and topologically characterize the set ofweightedmulticam-
eral rules that are compatible with a given political rule. We first
establish our results on the class of (3, 2)-political rules, and then
extend them to the class of (3, 3)-political rules. Before defining
the concept of compatibility, recall that any weighted multicam-
eral representation of a rule ϕ = (wij(p), qi)1≤i≤d,1≤j≤3,1≤p≤n can
be viewed as a vector of Rd×(3n+1) (see Appendix F for the vector
configuration). We have the following definition.
Definition 4. Let G = (N,V) be a (3, 2)-political rule and ϕ =
(wij(p), qi) ∈ Rd×(3n+1) a weighted multicameral representation
of G.
ϕ is V-compatible if for every vote profile X , the following two
conditions are satisfied:
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is strictly higher than the corresponding quota qi (V(X) = 1 if and
only ifwi(X) > qi for all 1 ≤ i ≤ d).
(2) X is losing if and only if the weight of X is strictly lower than
the quota in at least onehouse and is always distinct from the quota
in every house. (V(X) = 0 if and only if wi(X) < qi for some i and
wi(X) ≠ qi for all i).
We show that the set ofweightedmulticameral representations
of V that are V-compatible is an open set.
Theorem 5. Let G = (N,V) be a (3, 2)-political rule. The set of
weighted multicameral representations of V that are V-compatible
is an open set of Rd×(3n+1).
This result is proved by showing that the set of weighted mul-
ticameral representations of V , ϕ = (wij(p), qi) ∈ Rd×(3n+1),
that are V-compatible is the intersection of two open subsets of
Rd×(3n+1).
The immediate implication of this result is that all the proper-
ties of open sets ofRd×(3n+1) can be applied to the set ofV-compa-
tible weighted multicameral representations of the (3, 2)-political
rule G. For instance, if a weightedmulticameral representation of a
(3, 2)-political rule is subject to some sufficiently small perturba-
tions, the distribution of political power will remain unchanged.
This finding will prove important in the next section where we
show that any (3, 3)-political rule has a weighted multicameral
representation whose weights and quotas are integers, and pro-
pose a method to construct such a representation.
5.2. Integer weights and quotas
We show that any (3, 3)-political rule has a weighted mul-
ticameral representation in which weights and quota are inte-
gers. Such a representation is more intuitive, as it implies that the
weightswij(p) can now be interpreted as the number of votes held
by voter p in the house i when he chooses the level of approval
j. Such an interpretation is also more likely to be understood by
policymakers, lawmakers and shareholders who vote on a regular
basis, and to shed light on the real structure of power in an organi-
zation.
Theorem 6. Let G = (N,V) be a (3, 3)-political rule. G has a
weighted multicameral representation whose weights and quotas are
integers.
This result implies that one can always represent any (3, 3)-
political rule in a way that is understandable to any policymaker.
An example is our example in the Introduction where all weights
and quotas are integers. See Section 6 for other examples as well.
We now extend below the concept of the weight monotonicity
requirement introduced by Freixas and Zwicker (2003) for single-
house rules. It says that the higher the level of approval of a voter
for a given proposal, the higher should be his contribution to make
that proposal approved by the society.
Definition 5. Let G = (N,V) be a monotonic (3, 3)-political rule.
A weighted multicameral representation (w, q) of G satisfies the
‘‘weight monotonicity requirement ’’ if:
for every voter p ∈ N and for every 1 ≤ i ≤ d, wi1(p) ≥ wi2(p)
≥ wi3(p).
We show below that any (3, 3)-political rule admits a
weighted multicameral representation that satisfies the weight-
monotonicity requirement.
Theorem 7. Any monotonic (3, 3)-political rule has a weighted
multicameral representation that satisfies the weight-monotonicity
requirement.6. Applications
In this section, we apply our theoretical findings to some real-
life organizations. For each organization, we define its decision-
making rule and provide a weighted multicameral representation
of that rule with integer weights and quotas, and satisfying the
weight-monotonicity requirement.
6.1. The council of the international seabed authority
The International Seabed Authority is an intergovernmental
organization created in 1994 to monitor mineral-related activities
in the international seabed territories outside of states regulated
jurisdiction. The ISA has two principal organs: an assembly, which
consists of all the ISA members, and a 36-member council, elected
by the assembly. The council members are chosen to ensure the
equitable representation of countries from various groups. As
described by Bräuninger (2003), the members of the council are
distributed into four houses denoted by C1, C2, C3, C4 as follows:
C1: four states elected from among the largest consumers of the
minerals in question
C2: four states elected fromamong the largest investors in deep-
sea mining
C3: four states from among the largest net exporters
C4: six developing countries and eighteen additional states to
ensure a balanced geographical distribution of seats in the council.
In the ISA council, a decision on most issues requires a two-
thirds majority approval of its members on the proviso that such a
decision is not opposed by amajority in any of the four houses. This
voting rule can be modeled as a (3, 2)-political rule G = (N,V) as
follows:
For any vote profile X = (X1, X2, X3),
V(X) = 1 if and only if
|X1| ≥ 24
|X3 ∩ Ct | < 12 |Ct | , 1 ≤ t ≤ 4.
This decision-making rule was studied by Bräuninger (2003),
who proved that it is not of dimension one. In the following table,
we propose a weighted representation of the voting rule in each of
the four aforementioned houses and within the general council.
C1 C2 C3 C4 Council
w(consumer) (3, 2,−1) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) (1, 0, 0)
w(investor) (0, 0, 0) (3, 2,−1) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) (1, 0, 0)
w(exporter) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) (3, 2,−1) (0, 0, 0) (1, 0, 0)
w(others) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) (2, 2,−1) (1, 0, 0)
Quota 1 1 1 10 24
The vote in the ISA is a monotonic (3, 2)-political rule of
dimension 4 (the 2-dimension is (4, 0) and the quasi-dimension is
4). Indeed, the weighted multicameral representation of this vote
is given by the following table, where houses H1, H2 and H3 are
respectively identical to C1, C2 and C3 in the preceeding table and
the fourth house (H4) is the house which results from the merging
of C4 and the ‘‘Council’’.
H1 H2 H3 H4
w(consumer) (3, 2,−1) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) (10, 1, 0)
w(investor) (0, 0, 0) (3, 2,−1) (0, 0, 0) (10, 1, 0)
w(exporter) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) (3, 2,−1) (10, 1, 0)
w(others) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) (12, 1, 0)
Quota 1 1 1 265
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We study the voting rule for electing the Vice-President of the
United States when the Electoral College fails to do so. We show
that the quasi-dimension of this rule is 1.
When electing the Vice-President of the US, if no candidate re-
ceives the majority of the electoral votes, the Senate chooses be-
tween the two candidates with the highest number of votes in the
Electoral College. The US Senate consists of 100 Senators and the
current Vice-President. The voting rule is the absolutemajority rule
and does not explicitly specify the outcome of the rule if neither
candidate receives 51 votes. Let a and b be the two candidates with
the highest number of electoral votes. This voting mechanism can
be modeled as a monotonic (3, 3)-political rule G = (N,V) as fol-
lows. For every vote profileX = (X1, X2, X3), letX1,X2,X3 represent
the set of voterswho vote for a, abstain, and vote for b, respectively.
The three possible outcomes of the vote are: a wins, the vote is
inconclusive, b wins. The following model of this voting rule was
proposed by Freixas and Zwicker (2003):
V(X1, X2, X3) =
a if |X1| ≥ 51
inconclusive if |X1| < 51 and |X3| < 51
b if |X3| ≥ 51.
We argue that the quasi-dimension of this rule is 1 and its
2-dimension is (1, 1). Let G1 and G2 be two monotonic (3, 2)-
political rules defined as follows:
V1(X1, X2, X3) = 1 if and only if |X1| ≥ 51
V2(X1, X2, X3) = 1 if and only if (|X1| ≥ 51)
or (|X1| < 51 and |X3| < 51).
Aweighted representation ofG1 andG2 is respectively given by:
Rule G1 Rule G2
w(Senator) (1, 0, 0) (1, 1, 0)
w(Vice-President) (1, 0, 0) (1, 1, 0)
Quota 51 51
Both G1 and G2 are of dimension 1. Since G1 and G2 provide a
(3, 2)-decomposition of G, the quasi-dimension of G is 1 and the
2-dimension of G is (1, 1).
6.3. Core examination of graduate students in United States universi-
ties
In some US universities, Masters’ students have two options
when completing their Masters’ degree. They can either write a
thesis or take an exam. Students who choose the exam option are
pooledwith Ph.D. candidates to write a core examination. The core
examination usually combines several subjects. Suppose that the
core examination in a department of Economics is based on three
subjects: microeconomics, macroeconomics and econometrics.
Assume that the core examination committee consists of 6
members divided into 3 subcommittees as follows: the microeco-
nomics committee (2 members), the macroeconomics committee
(2 members), and the econometrics committee (2 members).
To each student taking the core examination, each committee
member assigns three decisions corresponding to their judgment
on the student’s performance on each of the three subjects. There
are three possible decisions for each subject: pass, marginal pass,
and fail. There are also three possible final outcomes for each
student. A student can pass the exam both at the Master and Ph.D.
levels, pass the exam only at the Master level, or fail the exam
both at the Master and Ph.D. levels. Passing the core examination
at a given level requires obtaining a certain grade on each subject.
Assume that a student must have at least one ‘‘pass’’ and one‘‘marginal pass’’ to pass a subject at the Ph.D. level, and at least two
‘‘marginal pass’’ or one ‘‘pass’’ to pass a subject at theMaster’s level.
The above described rule is a monotonic (3, 3)-political rule.
We denote the examination outcomes as follows: 2 = Ph.D., 1 =
Master, 0 = fail. For any vote profile X = (X1, X2, X3), X1, X2 and
X3 are respectively the set of professorswho vote ‘‘pass’’, ‘‘marginal
pass’’ and ‘‘fail’’. Denote by C1, C2, C3 the microeconomics commit-
tee, the macroeconomics committee, and the econometrics com-
mittee, respectively. On a given subject, only the corresponding
subcommittee has the full competence to judge the performance
of a student. Therefore, we assume that the decisions of the mem-
bers outside of a subcommittee do not affect the students’ outcome
for that subject. The above described core examination canbemod-
eled as a (3, 3)-political rule G = (N,V) as follows:
For any vote profile X = (X1, X2, X3),
V(X) =

Ph.D. if (|X1 ∩ Ct | = 2) or (|X1 ∩ Ct | = 1
and |X2 ∩ Ct | = 1) for all 1 ≤ t ≤ 3
Master if (|X2 ∩ Ct | = 2)
or (|X1 ∩ Ct | = 1) for all 1 ≤ t ≤ 3
Fail if
∃1 ≤ t ≤ 3, (|X3 ∩ Ct | ≥ 1) and (|X1 ∩ Ct | = 0).
Let G1 (resp. G2) be the monotonic (3, 2)-political rule that
determines whether a student will pass the core examination at
the Ph.D. (resp. at least at the Master level). G1 and G2 can be
defined as follows: for any vote profile X = (X1, X2, X3),
V1(X) = 1 if and only if V(X) = Ph.D.
V2(X) = 1 if and only if V(X) ∈ {Ph.D.,Master}.
The weighted representations of G1 and G2 are given by:
Rule G1 Rule G2
C1 C2 C3 C1 C2 C3
w(microeconomist) (2, 1, 0) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) (2, 1, 0) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0)
w(macroeconomist) (0, 0, 0) (2, 1, 0) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) (2, 1, 0) (0, 0, 0)
w(econometrician) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) (2, 1, 0) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) (2, 1, 0)
Quota 3 3 3 2 2 2
Therefore, both G1 and G2 are of dimension 3. Since G1 and G2
provide a decomposition of G as in Remark 1, the 2-dimension of G
is (3, 3).
One might want to modify the examination system to avoid
situations where Masters’ students are evaluated on econometrics
as is the case in certain universities. Assume, for example, that
every student is now required to have at least two ‘‘marginal pass’’
outcomes to pass microeconomics and macroeconomics. Ph.D.
students are required to have one ‘‘pass’’ or one ‘‘marginal pass’’ to
pass econometrics. The modified rule has the following weighted
multicameral representation:
Rule G1 Rule G2
C1 C2 C3 C1 C2
w(microeconomist) (3, 2, 0) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) (3, 2, 0) (0, 0, 0)
w(macroeconomist) (0, 0, 0) (3, 2, 0) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) (3, 2, 0)
w(econometrician) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) (2, 1, 0) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0)
Quota 4 4 3 4 4
G1 and G2 are respectively of dimension 3 and 2, and the 2-
dimension of G is (3, 2).
7. Concluding remarks
We have provided a policy basis for rationalizing, that is, inter-
preting, justifying and designing (3, 3)-political rules, a large class
of collective organizational rules analogous to those governing the
selection of papers in a peer-reviewed journal. The different ex-
amples investigated in the paper show that such rules can be ex-
tremely complex. Yet, we have shown that any such rule, nomatter
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eral legislatures: the first legislature determines whether a pro-
posal should be granted the highest level of collective approval,
such as accepting a paper, and the second legislature determines
whether it should only be approved at the intermediate level,
such as inviting a resubmission. Such a representation is a very
convenient way of modeling complex decision-making rules. It
also allows us to view any (3, 3)-political rule as a multi-criteria
decision-making rule under which decision-makers rate different
aspects of a finite-dimensional proposal, where each aspect is eval-
uated in a different specialized house using a weighted voting rule,
and each evaluator’s influence or weight possibly varies across
houses depending on his area(s) of expertise. Evaluators therefore
have decentralized authority, and each is seen as an expert in a
particular area.
We have also shown that it is always possible to design a (3, 3)-
political rule of any given 2-dimension. Practically, this finding
implies that it is always possible to design a rule under which a
proposal is collectively approved at a given level if and only if it
satisfies a certain number of ‘‘predefined criteria’’, so that one can
set the criteria for policies first, and then design the rules that ra-
tionalize the passage of policies meeting those criteria. This shows
that rules can be designed so as to be suitable only for the evalua-
tion of certain policies, and suggests a rationale for using different
rules to pass different policies. Accordingly, a unidimensional pol-
icy should be evaluated using a (3, 3)-political rule that has only
one house in each legislature, since only one aspect of the pol-
icy will be evaluated. However, multi-dimensional policy propos-
als should be evaluated under weighted multicameral legislatures,
where each house examines one aspect of the policy, and each leg-
islator is givenmoreweight in the house evaluating the aspect that
pertains to his area of expertise. We note that a legislator may be
expert in many areas, in which case he should have influence in
different houses.
Designing a collective rule based on a set of criteria to be met
by an ideal policy is not only transparent, but practical. Indeed, it
might be cumbersome to try to write a decision-making rule as we
did in our example in the Introduction. A simpler way of writing
the same rule would be to consider the matrix of weights, which
clearly show how much influence each evaluator wields along a
given criterion. If one wants to change the rule at some point, per-
haps because one wants to increase the standards of policies to
be adopted, or because one wants to get more evaluators involved
along each criterion, one can simplymodify theweights and/or the
quotas, which is simple (although thismight not be so easy in prac-
tice). For instance, one might change the weight matrix of the two
legislatures in that example as follows:
Original rule Modified rule
Theory Empirics Theory Empirics
Referee T1 (2, 1, 0) (0, 0, 0) (2, 1, 0) (1, 0, 0)
Referee T2 (2, 1, 0) (0, 0, 0) (2, 1, 0) (1, 0, 0)
Referee E1 (0, 0, 0) (2, 1, 0) (1, 0, 0) (2, 1, 0)
Referee E2 (0, 0, 0) (2, 1, 0) (1, 0, 0) (2, 1, 0)
Quota for
legislature 1
3 3 5 5
Quota for
legislature 2
1 1 3 3
We note that under the modified rule, it is harder to get a paper
accepted, or considered for resubmission, compared to the orig-
inal rule. Under the modified rule, while experts still have more
power in their area of expertise, their only opinion is no longer
sufficient to determine that a paper passes the test in their area.
For instance, while under the first rule, the coalition of theoreti-
cal referees {T1, T2} has dictatorial power on acceptance along thetheoretical dimension, it only has a veto right under the modified
rule. Similarly, as regarding the empirical assessment of the paper,
the coalition of empirical referees {E1, E2} has only a veto right
for acceptance under the modified rule, whereas they had dictato-
rial power under the first rule. However, each expert still has a veto
right alonghis area of expertise since thepaper cannot get accepted
(even after revision) without him strongly backing the decision.
These two rules might also be used by two different journals or
organizations. One lesson to be learned here is that writing such a
rule explicitly, as we did in the Introduction, could be very confus-
ing in some instances and could subject the written rule to differ-
ent interpretations. Similarly, writing the characteristic function of
a rulemay not let policymakers knowwhether the rule is really ap-
propriate for evaluating a given proposal, and itmay not be explicit
on the precise role of each evaluator. The table, on the contrary,
clearly shows the power structure among the different evaluators
along each dimension of a potential proposal, and should there-
fore be preferred to a written rule. It also shows that the original
and the modified rules are most appropriate for the evaluation of
two-dimensional policies.
We have also proposed two new concepts of dimension (the
quasi-dimension and the 2-dimension) and have shown that they
generalize the literature. While the traditional theory is easily in-
terpreted within our framework, we show that the 2-dimension
measure does not only capture the number of possible outputs
yielded by a (3, 3)-political rule, but it also takes into account
the hierarchy in these outputs. Furthermore, we have introduced
the concept of compatibility of a vector with a rule, which we
have used to show that there exist infinitely many weighted rules
that are strictly compatible with a (3, 3)-political rule, and that
these rules form a topologically open set. We have also proposed a
method to construct integer weights and quotas, which are more
intuitive, more relevant for rule design and policy-making, and
more transparent for policymakers. In sum, our results rational-
izemulticameralism in real-world organizations andmulti-criteria
groupdecision-making inmarket organizations (Baucells and Sarin
(2003)), and suggest a simple and rational policy-driven approach
to the design of collective rules.
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Appendix A. Proof of Proposition 1
If G is weighted, then {wij|i ∈ C1} and {wij|i ∈ C2} are the sys-
tems ofweights ofG1 andG2, respectively. Conversely, if {w1j}1≤j≤3
and {w2j}1≤j≤3 are respectively the systems of weights of the
weighted rules G1 and G2, define the system of weights of G, {wij},
as wij = w1j if i ∈ C1 and wij = w2j if i ∈ C2 with C1 = {1} and
C2 = {2}.
Appendix B. Proof of Theorem 2
The following lemma is needed to prove our result.
Lemma 1. Any monotonic (3, 2)-political rule has a weighted mul-
ticameral representation. More precisely, every monotonic (3, 2)-
political rule can be written as the minimum of a finite number of
weighted (3, 2)-political rules.
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(Y 1, . . . , Y d) the list of all the maximal losing tripartitions (or vote
profiles) of N . For every voter p ∈ N , define the matrix of the
weights of p as follows:
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ d and for all 1 ≤ j ≤ 3,
wij(p) =

0 if p ∈ Y ij ↑
1 otherwise.
The quota for each house i is qi = 1, 1 ≤ i ≤ d.
We have:
V(X) = 1 iff for all 1 ≤ i ≤ d, X ⊈3 Y i
iff for all 1 ≤ i ≤ d, there exists 1 ≤ j ≤ 3, Xj ↑⊈ Y ij ↑
iff for all 1 ≤ i ≤ d, there exist 1 ≤ j ≤ 3 and p ∈ Xj ↑
such that p ∉ Y ij ↑
iff for all 1 ≤ i ≤ d, there exist 1 ≤ j ≤ 3 and p ∈ Xj ↑
such thatwij(p) = 1
iff for all 1 ≤ i ≤ d, wi(X) ≥ qi.
Therefore, w = (wij)1≤i≤d,1≤j≤3 and q = (qi)1≤i≤d define a
weighted multicameral representation of G.
For each 1 ≤ i ≤ d, let Gi = (N,Vi) be the (monotonic)
weighted (3, 2)-political rule represented by (wij, qi). It can be eas-
ily shown that for every X ∈ N3,V(X) =min {Vi(X) | 1 ≤ i ≤ d}.
Proof of Theorem 2. Let G = (N,V) be a (monotonic) (3, 3)-
political rule and V1 ⋆ V2 the (3, 2)-decomposition of G (see
Remark 1). Following Lemma 1, V1 and V2 can respectively be
decomposed as theminimumof a finite number ofweighted (3, 2)-
political rules {V1i }1≤i≤ d1 and {V2i′ }1≤i′≤ d2 . For every 1 ≤ r ≤ 2, 1 ≤
i ≤ d1 or 1 ≤ i ≤ d2, let wri = (wrij)1≤j≤3 be the matrix functions
of voters’ weights in the rule Vri , and q
r
i the quota of V
r
i . Define
C1 = {1, . . . , d1}, C2 = {d1 + 1, . . . , d1 + d2}, and w and q as
follows: for every voter p,
wij(p) =

w1ij(p) if i ∈ C1
w2i−d1j(p) if i ∈ C2
qi =

q1i if i ∈ C1
q2i−d1 if i ∈ C2.
For every vote profile X ∈ N3:
V(X) = 2 ⇐⇒ V1(X) = 1 and V2(X) = 1
⇐⇒ V1i (X) = 1 and V2i (X) = 1,∀1 ≤ i ≤ d1, 1 ≤ i ≤ d2
⇐⇒ wi(X) ≥ qi, ∀i ∈ C1 ∪ C2.
V(X) = 1 ⇐⇒ V1(X) = 0 and V2(X) = 1
⇐⇒ ∃ 1 ≤ i ≤ d1,V1i (X) = 0 and V2i′ (X) = 1,∀1 ≤ i′ ≤ d2
⇐⇒ min{V1i (X)+ V2i′ (X)| 1 ≤ i ≤ d1,
1 ≤ i′ ≤ d2} = 1.
V(X) = 0 ⇐⇒ V1(X) = 0 and V2(X) = 0
⇐⇒ ∃ 1 ≤ i ≤ d1, 1 ≤ i ≤ d2,V1i (X) = 0
and V2i (X) = 0⇐⇒ ∃ i ∈ C2, wi(X) < qi.
Furthermore, each V1i +V2i′ is a quasi-weighted (3, 3)-political
rule, and it is easy to show that V = min{V1i + V2i′ | 1 ≤ i ≤ d1,
1 ≤ i′ ≤ d2}.Appendix C. Proof of Theorem 3
The (3, 2)-decomposition of amonotonic (3, 3)-political rule as
described in Remark 1 yields a unique pair of monotonic (3, 2)-
political rules. Since the notion of dimension is well-defined on the
class of monotonic (3, 2)-political rules (following Lemma 1), the
2-dimension of any monotonic (3, 3)-political rule always exists.
Appendix D. Proof of Proposition 3
Let m be a positive integer and N = {1, 2, . . . , 2m}. Define
a monotonic (3, 2)-political rule G = (N,V) by: for every vote
profile X = (X1, X2, X3),
V(X) = 1 iff X1 ∩ {2i− 1, 2i} ≠ ∅,∀1 ≤ i ≤ m.
Below is a two-step proof that the dimension of the above-
described monotonic (3, 2)-political rule ism.
Step 1: first, we show thatG is aminimumofmweightedmono-
tonic (3, 2)-political rules.
For 1 ≤ i ≤ m, let Gi = (N,Vi) be the weighted monotonic
(3, 2)-political rule represented by (wij, qi)1≤j≤3 defined as fol-
lows: for every p ∈ N ,
wij(p) =

1 if j = 1 and p ∈ {2i− 1, 2i}
0 otherwise
qi = 1.
Let X ∈ N3 be a winning vote profile.
X ∈ V−1{1} iff X1 ∩ {2i− 1, 2i} ≠ ∅, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m
iff there is p ∈ N such thatwij(p) = 1, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m
iff wi(X) ≥ qi, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m
iff X ∈ V−1i {1},∀1 ≤ i ≤ m
iff X ∈ ∩ V−1i {1} | 1 ≤ i ≤ m .
Thus V−1{1} = ∩ V−1i {1} | 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
Step 2: our next goal is to show that G is not the minimum of
m − 1 weighted monotonic (3, 2)-political rules. Assume on the
contrary that G can be written as the minimum ofm− 1 weighted
monotonic (3, 2)-political rules G
′
i represented by (w
′
ij, q
′
i)1≤j≤3.
For every 1 ≤ i ≤ m, define Y i = (N − {2i− 1, 2i} , {2i− 1,
2i} ,∅).
Each Y i is a losing vote profile of G. Therefore, we can pick one
of them− 1 weighted monotonic (3, 2)-political rules in which Y i
has a weight less than the quota of that monotonic (3, 2)-political
rule. By the pigeonhole principle, we can assume without losing
generality that we have a similar weighted monotonic (3, 2)-
political rule G
′
t that makes both Y
1 and Y 2 losing vote profiles.
Let X1 and X2 be two vote profiles defined as follows:
X1 = (N − {2, 3} , {2, 3} ,∅) and X2 = (N − {1, 4} , {1, 4} ,∅).
Since X1 and X2 (resp. Y 1 and Y 2) are twowinning (resp. losing)
vote profiles of the monotonic (3, 2)-political rule G
′
t , it must be
the case thatw
′
t(X
1)+w′t(X2) ≥ 2q′t andw′t(Y 1)+w′t(Y 2) < 2q′t .
However, this cannot hold because w
′
t(X
1)+ w′t(X2) = w′t(Y 1)+
w
′
t(Y
2). Therefore, it is impossible to write G as the minimum of
m− 1 monotonic (3, 2)-political rules.
Appendix E. Proof of Theorem 4
Let N = {1, 2, . . . , 2d1, 2d1 + 1, . . . , 2d1 + 2d2}. Define the
monotonic (3, 3)-political rule G = (N,V) by: for every vote pro-
file X = (X1, X2, X3),
V(X) = 2 iff ∀1 ≤ i ≤ d1,∀1 ≤ i′
≤ d2 (X1 ∩ {2i− 1, 2i} ≠ ∅)
and (X1 ∩ {2d1 + 2i′ − 1, 2d1 + 2i′} ≠ ∅)
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and (X1 ∩ {2d1 + 2i′ − 1, 2d1 + 2i′}
≠ ∅,∀1 ≤ i′ ≤ d2)
V(X) = 0 iff ∃ 1 ≤ i ≤ d1, ∃ 1 ≤ i′
≤ d2, (X1 ∩ {2i− 1, 2i} = ∅)
and (X1 ∩ {2d1 + 2i′ − 1, 2d1 + 2i′} = ∅).
Let G1 = (N,V1) and G2 = (N,V2) be two monotonic (3, 2)-
political rules defined as: for every vote profile X = (X1, X2, X3),
V1(X) = 1 iff X1 ∩ {2i− 1, 2i} ≠ ∅ ∀1 ≤ i ≤ d1.
V2(X) = 1 iff X1 ∩ {2d1 + 2i′ − 1, 2d1 + 2i′} ≠ ∅
∀1 ≤ i′ ≤ d2.
The method used to construct G1 and G2 is the same as the one
used in the proof of Theorem 3. Therefore, the monotonic (3, 2)-
political rules G1 and G2 are respectively of dimensions d1 and d2.
Furthermore, G1 ⋆ G2 is the (3, 2)-decomposition of G. This allows
us to conclude that the 2-dimension of G is (d1, d2).
Appendix F. Configuration of the matrix of weights of a
multicameral rule as a vector of Rd×(3n+1)
Let u and v be two positive integers. It is always possible to
define a one-to-one function between the setMu×v(R) of all the
u × v real matrices and Ru×v . Consider the one-to-one function f
defined fromMd×(3n+1)(R) to Rd×(3n+1) that maps the matrixw =
(wi,j(p), qi)1≤i≤d,1≤j≤3,1≤p≤n to the vector f (w) defined by:
f (w) = (w11(1), w12(1), w13(1), . . . ,
w11(n), w12(n), w13(n), q1, . . . ,
wd1(1), wd2(1), wd3(1), . . . ,
wd1(n), wd2(n), wd3(n), qd).
f allows us to view a weighted multicameral representation of
a (3, 2)-political rule as a vector of Rd×(3n+1).
Appendix G. Proof of Theorem 5
Define the sets UG and VG as follows:
UG = ∩{UX | X is a winning vote profile} where: UX = {ϕ ∈
Rd×(3n+1) | wi(X) > qi,∀1 ≤ i ≤ d}.
VG = ∩{VX | X is a losing vote profile} where: VX = {ϕ ∈
Rd×(3n+1) | ∃ 1 ≤ i ≤ d, wi(X) < qi andwi(X) ≠ qi,∀1 ≤ i ≤ d}.
The following two lemmas are needed to establish our result.
Lemma 2. Let G = (N,V) be a (3, 2)-political rule. The sets UG and
VG are open sets of Rd×(3n+1).
Proof. For any vote profile X , define:
hX : Rd×(3n+1) −→ Rd
ϕ = (wij(p), qi) −→ (wi(X)− qi)1≤i≤d.
The function hX is well-defined and continuous.
Let us show that UG is an open set of Rd×(3n+1).
UX is an open set of Rd×(3n+1) because UX is the inverse image
of an open subset of Rd by the continuous function hX , as shown
below:
UX =

ϕ ∈ Rd×(3n+1) | wi(X) > qi ∀1 ≤ i ≤ d

= ϕ ∈ Rd×(3n+1) | hX (ϕ) ∈ ]0,+∞[d
= h−1X (]0,+∞[d).
UG is the intersection of a finite number of open sets of
Rd×(3n+1). Therefore UG is an open set of Rd×(3n+1).
Now, let us show that VX is an open subset of Rd×(3n+1).For every ϕ ∈ VX , write: d1ϕ = |{i|wi(X) > qi}| and d2ϕ = |{i|
wi(X) < qi}|. Notice that hX (ϕ) ∈ Vϕ where Vϕ is the cartesian
product of d1ϕ sets ]0,+∞[ and d2ϕ sets ] − ∞, 0[. Vϕ is an open
set of Rd×(3n+1). Furthermore,
VX = {ϕ ∈ Rd×(3n+1) | hX (ϕ) ∈ Vϕ}
= ∪{h−1X (Vϕ) | ϕ ∈ VX }.
VX is a union of open sets of Rd×(3n+1), which implies that VX
is an open set of Rd×(3n+1). Since VG is the intersection of a finite
number of open sets of Rd×(3n+1), VG is an open set of Rd×(3n+1).
Lemma 3. Let G = (N,V) be a (3, 2)-political rule. The set Γ (G) of
all the vectorsϕ ∈ Rd×(3n+1) that areV-compatible is the intersection
of UG and VG.
Proof. (1) Let us show that Γ (G) is included in the intersection of
UG and VG.
Let ϕ ∈ Rd×(3n+1) be a vector that isV-compatible and X a vote
profile.
If X is a winning vote profile, then wi(X) > qi for all 1 ≤ i ≤ d.
Therefore ϕ ∈ UX . This implies that ϕ ∈ UG = ∩{UX | X is a
winning vote profile}.
If X is a losing vote profile, then there exists 1 ≤ i ≤ d such that
wi(X) < qi. Therefore, ϕ ∈ VX . This implies that ϕ ∈ VG = ∩{VX |
X is a losing vote profile}.
(2) Let us show that the intersection of UG and VG is included in
Γ (G).
Let ϕ = (wij(p), qi) ∈ Rd×(3n+1).
If ϕ ∈ UG, then for any winning tripartition X ,wi(X) > qi,∀1 ≤
i ≤ d.
If ϕ ∈ VG, then for any losing tripartition X , there exists 1 ≤ i ≤
d such thatwi(X) < qi andwi(X) ≠ qi,∀1 ≤ i ≤ d. Therefore, ϕ is
V-compatible.
It follows from (1) and (2) that Γ (G) is the intersection of UG
and VG.
Now, we can now prove our main result.
Proof of Theorem 5. Because Γ (G) can be decomposed as an in-
tersection of open sets ofRd×(3n+1) (Lemma 3),Γ (G) is an open set
of Rd×(3n+1).
Appendix H. Proof of Theorem 6
To proof our main result, we will need the following lemmas
that are also interesting on their own.
Lemma 4. Let G = (N,V) be a (3, 2)-political rule. If ϕ = (wij(p),
qi) ∈ Rd×(3n+1) is a weighted multicameral representation of G, then
there exists q
′ ∈ Rd such that ϕ ′ = (wij(p), q′i) is V-compatible.
Proof. Defineµi as the lower boundof the set {wi(X) | wi(X) ≥ qi,
X ∈ N3} and λi as the upper bound of the set {wi(X) | wi(X) < qi,
X ∈ N3}. Notice that λi < qi ≤ µi. Define q′i = µi+λi2 and consider
a vote profile X .
If X is a winning vote profile, then wi(X) ≥ µi > q′i , for all 1 ≤
i ≤ d.
If X is a losing vote profile, then there exists 1 ≤ i ≤ d such that
wi(X) ≤ λi < q′i .
Thus ϕ
′ = (wij(p), q′i) is V-compatible.
It follows that a V-compatible vector can be obtained from a
weighted multicameral representation of a (3, 2)-political rule G.
Altering theweights of voters is unnecessary. A judicious alteration
of the quotas of G is sufficient. A corollary to the previous lemma
is the following.
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cameral rule if and only if there exists ϕ ∈ Rd×(3n+1) that is V-
compatible.
Lemma 5. Let G be a (3, 2)-political rule. G has a weighted multi-
cameral representation if and only if there exists ϕ ∈ Qd×(3n+1) that
is V-compatible.
Proof. If G has a weighted multicameral representation, then
Γ (G) is a nonempty open subset of Rd×(3n+1) (Theorem 5). The
denseness ofQd×(3n+1) inRd×(3n+1) yields a ϕ ∈ Γ (G)∩Qd×(3n+1).
The converse is trivial.
Lemma 6. Let G be (3, 2)-political rule. G has a weighted multicam-
eral representation if and only if there exists ϕ ∈ Zd×(3n+1) that is
V-compatible.
Proof. If G has a weighted multicameral representation, then
Γ (G) ∩ Qd×(3n+1) ≠ ∅ (Lemma 5).
Pick χ = ( aij(p)bij(p) ,
ci
di
) ∈ Γ (G) ∩ Qd×(3n+1) where (bij(p), di) ∈
Nd×(3n+1). Let σ be the least common multiple of the set {bij(p),
di}1≤i≤d,1≤j≤3,1≤p≤n andϕ = σχ . It readily follows thatϕ ∈ Γ (G)∩
Zd×(3n+1). The converse is trivial.
Proof of Theorem 6. Let G1 ⋆ G2 the (3, 2)-decomposition of a
(3, 3)-political rule G. The monotonicity of G insures the mono-
tonicity ofG1 andG2.We can findweightedmulticameral represen-
tations of G1 and G2 with integer weights and quotas (Lemma 6).
Use these systems of weights to construct a weighted multicam-
eral representation of G with integer weights and quotas. For the
method of construction, see the proof of Theorem 2.
Appendix I. Proof of Theorem 7
Let w = (wij, qi)1≤i≤d,1≤j≤3 be a weighted multicameral rep-
resentation of G that violates the weight-monotonicity require-
ment. This implies there is a voter x ∈ N and a house t such that
wtl(x) < wtl+1(x), with 1 ≤ t ≤ d, 1 ≤ l ≤ 2.
Construct the new weighted multicameral representation u of
G as follows:
uij(p) =

wtl+1(p) if p = x, i = t and j = l
wtl(p) if p = x, i = t and j = l+ 1
wij(p) otherwise.
Wewant to show that both u andw identically distribute the el-
ements ofN3 into the group ofwinning and losing vote profiles. Let
X be any vote profile with x ∈ Xl+1 and Y the vote profile derived
from X by shifting voter x to Xl. We see that:
1. V(X) ≤ V(Y ) (by monotonicity), and for every 1 ≤ i ≤ d,
wi(X) > wi(Y ).
2. ui(X) = wi(Y ) and ui(Y ) = wi(X).
Therefore, for every 1 ≤ i ≤ d, wi(X) ≥ qi if and only if
wi(Y ) ≥ qi (from (1)), which happens if and only if ui(X) ≥ qi
(from (2)).
The technique may be repeated for each voter whose weights
violate the weight-monotonicity requirement.References
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